Fallacy Of Accent: 'If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him': Satire Und Theology Version

Fallacy Of Accent

Preface

Photo: Portofino, Italy, 20221014, Facebook

Article originally published on Blogger 20151104, revised on Blogger for an entry on academia.edu 20251013.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

The review of the Pirie text continues. Note: A formal fallacy is concerned with presenting a logical form to avoid being fallacious, and an informal fallacy occurs when there are errors in reasoning with a premise (s) and conclusion. This entry deals with an informal fallacy.

Pirie

Cited

'The fallacy of accent defends for its effectiveness on the fact the meaning of statements can change, depending on the stress put on words. The accenting of words or phrases can give a meaning quite different from that intended, and can add implications which are not part of the literal meaning.' (31).

Example used

'Light your cigarette' (31).

a) Without accent it looks like an invitation. (31).
b) As opposed to lighting a tablecloth or something else. (31).
c) Instead of someone else. (31).
d) Instead of sticking it in your ear. (31).

The author notes that by changing the accent, the meaning can be changed. (31)

The large letter emphasis is mine, based on the Pirie examples...

'Light your cigarette', reads like an invitation or instruction.

''Light your CIGARETTE', reads as if an instruction to light the cigarette instead of something else.

'Light YOUR cigarette' read like an instruction to light your own cigarette and not another's.

'LIGHT your cigarette' reads as an invitation, instead of sticking it in your ear.

The author states: 'The fallacy lies with the additional implications introduced by emphasis. (32).

For this website context, that being philosophical theology, philosophy of religion, philosophy and Bible, this following statement from Pirie is relevant and profound:

'Your most widespread use of the fallacy of accent can be to discredit opponents by quoting them with an emphasis they never indented'. (32). He notes that Richelieu needed 'six lines by which to hang an honest man.' (32).

Cardinal Richelieu of France

I reason he is meaning Cardinal Richelieu of France. This would be a good historical example where Christianity was politicized and did not closely follow the Gospel of Jesus Christ and his disciples, the Apostles and scribes which through divine revelation promoted Gospel truth. 

The use of accent in a fallacious manner can twist words for the purpose of a lie. One should pay special attention to the educated and elite, whether in a political, corporate, religious or other context when he or she may be using the fallacy of accent to persuade the masses.

Oxford Reference.com 

Oxford Essential Quotations (5 ed.) Edited by: Susan Ratcliffe 

Publisher: Oxford University Press Published online: 2017

Current Online Version: 2017DOI: 10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001eISBN: 9780191843730 

Cited

'Cardinal Richelieu 1585–1642 French cleric and statesman

If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him. attributed'

Adam Smith Institute 

Cited 

'Cardinal Richelieu is remembered for making France into a centralized state by building up the power of the crown and weakening that of the nobles. He used brutal methods to do so, building up a network of spies and informers, having the rivals and opponents of his power executed, and banning political discussion in public bodies. His reputation was forever cast by Alexandre Dumas in “The Three Musketeers,” who portrayed him as a ruthless, power-hungry and cynical ruler. He will be remembered for his famous observation, “If you give me six lines written by the hand of the most honest of men, I will find something in them which will hang him.” And he did have quite a few people hanged.'

---

But of course the masses can use the fallacy as well.

Aristotle

This fallacy was noted by Aristotle. 

The Internet Classics Archive: On Sophistical Refutations By Aristotle: Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (circa 350 BC)

Cited

'An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in unwritten discussion; in written discussions and in poetry it is easier. Thus (e.g.) some people emend Homer against those who criticize as unnatural his expression to men ou kataputhetai ombro. For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent, pronouncing the ou with an acuter accent. Also, in the passage about Agamemnon's dream, they say that Zeus did not himself say 'We grant him the fulfilment of his prayer', but that he bade the dream grant it. Instances such as these, then, turn upon the accentuation.'

---

Zeus stating something differs from Zeus stating that a dream stated something.

Accent fallacy relies on unclear, unconcise, emphasis and tone presented. This can be verbal or written.

There are various related fallacies, but...

Amphiboly was a related fallacy mentioned by Aristotle. It uses ambiguous, unclear, unconcise syntax and grammar. This can be verbal or written.

--- 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Jonathan Edwards (PhD Edit): Satire Und Theology Version

New Zealand-Dean Hintz

Jonathan Edwards (PhD Edit)

Photo is from the Green Dragon, where The Lord of the Rings and The Hobbit films have been made.

Preface

A previous article linked below, was also concerning Jonathan Edwards and some of that material ended up in the PhD thesis. There is a version of this on academia.edu. 

Thursday, August 31, 2006 Jonathan Edwards and Libertarian Free Will

This article is also revised on Blogger for a version on academic.edu. The article presents the PhD thesis material where I cited Edwards. This is selective and non-exhaustive.

PhD & MPhil

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD 

Sovereignty and Providence

Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758)(1729)(2006) writes that God has the power to bestow upon anyone of his creatures good, evil, or indifference for the greater good.[1]  This sovereign control is accepted despite the obvious problem of evil occurring in God’s creation.[2]  Attempts to harmonize strong concepts of God’s divine control over his creation, with the apparent corrupt nature of what he has made in regard to the problem of evil, will be described within this thesis as sovereignty theodicy.[3]  In Law of Nature, Edwards  (1731-1733)(2006) explains that providence is the means by which God governs the world as the supreme judge of the universe.[4]  Reichenbach notes that providence is how God guides and cares for his creation.[5]  He further reasons that God on one hand possesses wisdom in order to direct his creation within his plans, and on the other hand has the power by which he attempts to implement his plans.[6]  Reichenbach deduces that God’s providential plans allow for significant human freedom and choices to occur.[7]

Free Will And Determinism

Edwards thinks there is a major difficulty within libertarian concepts concerning free will.[8]  If the human will determines the will and resulting choices, since every choice must have a cause, then a chain is established where a will and choice is determined by a preceding will and choice. Therefore, if the will determines its own free acts, then every free act of will and choice is determined by a preceding act of will and choice. If a preceding act of will also be of free choice, then that too was self-determined.[9]  What Edwards is stating is that in the act of causing a free choice (choice1), the cause of that choice was also made freely (choice2), and the cause of that choice was made freely (choice3) and so on. 

This theological concept of Edwards would tie into the philosophical concept of vicious regress[10] since with a regress it could not be determined what caused a human choice initially, because every free choice was caused by a previous free choice. Edwards instead reasoned that human choices were a result of human nature originally created by and within God’s will. God therefore wills all things, and is the primary cause of all actions.[11]  I reason human actions, and any angelic or demonic actions would be accepted  as a secondary cause[12] in order to avoid concepts of hard determinism, where only God or the first cause would be morally responsible for acts.[13] 

Blackburn counters that some form of metaphysical libertarianism[14] postulates that free choice is not causally determined, but is also not random.[15]  It is suggested that an agency situated outside of human nature,[16] in regard to making human choice, is possible but likely ‘fantasy.’[17]  It appears human choice should be traced back to human nature.[18] 

Edwards writes that God controls all things.[19]  The sovereignty approach can present the remedy for the problem of evil in a practical sense, not just primarily philosophically.[20]  The approach needs to focus on the idea that the triune God consummates his Kingdom and gives things meaning.  It seems rather meaningless for a Christian to readily accept a notion of God willing all things for a greater good within a theological system when the greater good is not vividly practically explained within the system, at least in general ultimate terms.[21]

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust. 

CHADWICK, HENRY (1992) ‘Introduction’, in Confessions, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

http://edwards.yale.edu/archive/documents/page?document_id=10817&search_id=&source_type=edited&pagenumber=1

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,  Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

REICHENBACH, BRUCE (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers. 

---

[1] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).

[2] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).

[3] Feinberg (1994: 124-143).

[4] Edwards (1731-1733)(2006: 553).

[5] Reichenbach (1986: 115).

[6] Reichenbach (1986: 115).

[7] Reichenbach (1986: 118).

[8] Which would correspond to modern concepts of libertarian free will and incompatibilism.

[9] Edwards (1754)(2006 2.1: 1-1-2). 

[10] Blackburn (1996: 324).

[11] Edwards (1754)(2006 2.1: 1-1-2). 

[12] Pojman (1996: 596).  Stace (1952)(1976: 29). 

[13] Pojman and Stace both state a secondary cause must freely commit acts in order to be significantly morally accountable.  Pojman (1996: 596).  Stace (1952)(1976: 29). 

[14] Blackburn (1996: 218).

[15] Blackburn (1996: 218).

[16] It appears Blackburn is discussing a human agency.

[17] Blackburn (1996: 218).

[18] Edwards (1754)(2006 2.1: 1-1-2).  Blackburn (1996: 218).  Within my Reformed world view I reason God created this nature and simultaneously influences and wills all human choice.

[19] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).

[20] This is where empirical theology can be beneficial.

[21] I can admit this can be a weakness within sometimes overly philosophical Reformed approaches.

Augustine v Feinberg: Satire Und Theology Version

Augustine v Feinberg

Preface

Photo: University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, official.

Article posted originally, 20170504, revised on Blogger for an article on academia.edu, 20250927.

Augustine (354-430)

John S. Feinberg (1946-)

University of Wales, Trinity Saint David (2009), PhD Viva for Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010)

My external and internal reviewers opined that Augustine, my first historical example within incompatibilism, was considered the far better historical source, within the problem of evil/theodicy discussion, than was John S. Feinberg, my main Reformed, compatibilism, example.

I disagreed.

Note that the external reviewer intentionally, he said (paraphrased), wanted to make the Viva a little heated, as I seemed too calm. He wanted to know that I really cared. So, I warmed up...

I based much of my Reformed theodicy approach via John S. Feinberg and secondarily as an historical source, John Calvin. I replied that popularity was irrelevant, and academic truth was not a popularity contest. I also pointed point out that one of my reviewers was a noted Roman Catholic, more likely to follow Augustine than Feinberg, that was a Reformed theologian and philosopher. I also mentioned that I did reference John Calvin in regards to free will and determinism, and he would rival Augustine in the popularity contest department. 

If one wished to play that game.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe. Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26).

Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labeled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130).

I found Feinberg’s explanation of this a bit repetitive and it would perhaps be good for him to have speculated on God’s reasons for willingly allowing evil in more specific terms as I have to some degree in my work.

Some of views discussed within the Viva...

Incompatibilism versus Compatibilism

Libertarian free will 

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There cannot be another, predetermined, simultaneous cause in a theoretical chain within indeterminism. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions, my add) or simultaneous (at the same time, my add) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Geisler (1996: 429). For the context of the Viva, libertarian free will was viewed as synonymous with incompatibilism.

Incompatibilism/Indeterminism 

Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60). Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. 

Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples) Significant human free will would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism. 

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which he reasoned was also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Significant freedom for incompatibilism, does not allow pre-determination, on the person, before being committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1, John 1, as examples). 

This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause. David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God. Again to Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. 

Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75). 

Feinberg explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism. 

Limited free will 

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.

Compatibilism/Soft determinism 

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons, angelic beings and demonic beings, for example. 

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). As Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). 

Hard determinism 

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). During the Viva, the external examiner asked me if I believed in fatalism. I stated that I did not as I reasoned that fatalism was an impersonal concept and not within a theistic, planned, reality. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). 

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586). 

Fini

I was told by reviewers that I did an excellent job in the Viva. With God's help, I will take it...

---

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html 

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD 

The Orthodox Study Bible: Zeal: Here is no heathen fanaticism: Satire Und Theology Version

The Orthodox Study Bible: Zeal

Preface

Originally published 20200514, significantly revised on Blogger for an article on academia.edu 20250920. My review of this academic study bible continues from my Reformed tradition, as I comment on Orthodoxy from the outside.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee. 

The Orthodox Study Bible: Zeal

Glossary

Reverend John W. Morris, Ph.D

Zeal

The definition here is 'devotion, enthusiastic obedience to God' (810). The Apostle Paul warns against a misguided zeal not based in knowledge, such as in Romans 10: 2-3. (810).

The Apostle Paul wrote in regards to the religious Jews...

Romans 10:2-3 New American Standard Bible (NASB) 2 For I testify about them that they have a zeal for God, but not in accordance with knowledge. 3 For not knowing about God’s righteousness and seeking to establish their own, they did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God.

Bible Hub: Romans 10: 2

αὐτοῖς ὅτι ζῆλον θεοῦ ἔχουσιν

(to them)  (that)  (a zeal)  (of God)

to them that have a zeal of/for God.

ζῆλον is a noun, accusative, masculine, singular in Romans 10: 2.

Bible Hub: Root word and New Testament examples

Original Word: ζῆλος, ου, ὁ

In the context of Romans 10: 2, Jon Courson states that 'To this day, the Jews are zealous for God'. (958). But, theologically and respectfully to Judaism, this is works righteousness based on keeping the law, and not the imputed righteousness of Jesus Christ to the chosen (Romans 8-9, Ephesians 1), by grace through faith (Romans, Galatians 2, Ephesians 1-2).

I will admit that there is faith in Judaism of course, but works righteousness still exists. There are many religious faiths and non-religious worldviews with good morality and ethics. Within my classically, biblically inspired, Reformed theology, this divine righteousness (Romans, Galatians as textual examples) is imputed and applied to believers as legal and theological, justification, within the atonement.

In regards to Paul's comments concerning the religiously zealous Jews, Cranfield writes: 'Here is no heathen fanaticism' (251). The Jews have the 'right object' (251) that being their Hebrew Bible concept of God, in mind. In Romans 10: 2, both the terms for 'zeal' and 'God' are important. (251). The zeal here is seeking attention for something which is worthy of glory. (251). That in context, being God. 'Zeal for the one true God'. (251). This is not zeal for one of the 'false gods of a corrupt society' (251). But the Apostle Paul here explains that the Jews lacked knowledge (v2), that being knowledge of the gospel (251). Cranfield opines here that there is a 'disastrous flaw' with the zeal of the Jews, according to Paul. It seems to me Paul is stating here the the religious Jews knew about God, but as they did not know and accept the triune God of the gospel and therefore their religious zeal was disastrously in error. 

This divine zeal, unlike human zeal, when gospel focused, has God's righteousness in Jesus Christ, states the Orthodox Study Bible at Romans 10: 3. (362). '3 For not knowing about God’s righteousness and seeking to establish their own, they did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God.' The religious righteousness of the Hebrew religion did not suffice for membership into the Kingdom of God, that could only occur through regeneration (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1) and being justified in the righteousness of Jesus Christ through his applied atoning work for believers, which also led to the culminated resurrection of believers. Cranfield is correct that the Jews did not have a sufficient righteousness of their own, which they were trying to establish religiously. At the same time, they would not submit to the applied righteousness of God incarnate, Jesus Christ within gospel salvation. (252).

Mounce explains that in regards to Romans 10, the Jews sought righteousness by 'personal merit rather than by faith.' (206). In agreement with the comments of Cranfield, Mounce opines that the text has Paul explaining that the religious Jews zeal was not guided by knowledge (Romans 10: 2) (207). They wanted righteousness of their own, within their own religion, as opposed to the righteousness of Jesus Christ, within the gospel.

Romans 10: 4 New American Standard Bible (NASB) 4 For Christ is the [a]end of the Law for righteousness to everyone who believes.  Footnotes: Romans 10: 4 Or goal

Christ is the end of the law (207). Cranfield writes the end here could be interpreted in three ways .1 fulfillment 2. termination 3. goal (252). Regardless, teleologically, justification within salvation and entrance into the Kingdom of God, was not to be pursued or found through the Hebrew Biblical, Mosaic law, or any Hebrew covenant. But through the applied atoning and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

τέλος 

Cited

Romans 10:4 N-NNS 

GRK: τέλος γὰρ νόμου 

NAS: For Christ is the end of the law 

KJV: For Christ [is] the end of the law for INT: [the] end indeed of law

5056.telos

Cited

Original Word: τέλος 

Lexical Summary telos: End, purpose, goal, completion, fulfillment 

Original Word: τέλος

---

Related

According to Nelson's, Zealotes/Zealot (s) in the historical context was defined as a 'zealous one'. (807). These were a party of Jews violently opposed to the Roman Empire and its occupation of Israel. (807). Noted to be from the 1st Century, in context.

To be zealous is to be full of zeal. (Oxford: 1629). In modern times, and to this day, a zealot (zealots) can be considered someone that is 'an uncompromising or extreme partisan; a fanatic.' (1629). Often used in political contexts for those that are very pro-Israel. I will opine here that false zeal, need not be just religious, but could be political as well. Placing too much hope in the political process at the neglect of trusting in the one and true God. I am not, at all, rejecting the political process, but I am stating that the zeal for politics, in the biblical Christian, should not equate in importance to zeal for the gospel and the triune God.
---

BRUCE, F.F., (1963)(1996) Romans, Grand Rapids, IVP/Eerdmans. 

COAD, F. ROY (1986) ‘Galatians’, in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

HARPUR, GEORGE (1986) Ephesians in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

NELSON'S THREE-IN-ONE BIBLE REFERENCE COMPANION, 'Zealous' (1982), Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (1995) ‘Sceptical’, Della Thompson (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.