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PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.
From Pirie
'The fallacy of abusive analogy is a highly specialized version of the ad hominem argument. Instead of the arguer being insulted directly, an analogy is drawn which is calculated to bring him into scorn or disrepute. The opponent or his behaviour is compared with something which will elicit an unfavourable response toward him from the audience.' (29).
Pirie provides the example:
'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29).
'(This is true, but is intended as abuse so that the hearer will be more sympathetic to the possibility of certain knowledge.) (29).'
In other words, with Pirie's explanation, science using inductive reasoning, testing and empirical research may not claim certainty, at least in some cases, but there is still considerable, significant knowledge that has been obtained through the scientific method. A lack of certainty with inductive scientific reasoning, does not for example, by default make certain deductive philosophical and theological reasoning certain.
An analogy is not effective here as inductive and deductive reasoning succeeds or fails based on the trueness of premises and conclusions presented.
Blackburn explains that arguing by analogy is stating that since things are alike in some ways they will 'probably' (14) be alike in others. (14). The use of 'probably' here is key. Often arguing by analogy produces some similarities and some differences rendering the argument unsound.
If such an argument is used comparing only the things certainly alike it is reasonable.
However, Blackburn cites Wittgenstein, noting it can be irresponsible to generalize one case. (14).
In other words, generalizing by argument of analogy can be irresponsible.
Wittgenstein’s Generalisations About Generalisations: Medium-Dec 12, 2019
Anat Biletzki
Generalities lead to error when they produce reasoning that fails to embrace true statements and or true premise (s) and conclusion. Better to specifically review and produce statements and or premise (s) and conclusion for accuracy in truth.
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PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.
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