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David Hume: Preface
Blackburn describes David Hume (1711-1776) the Scottish philosopher, historian and writer as the most influential modern naturalist. Blackburn (1996: 179). Hume would also be known as an empiricist and Blackburn correctly notes Hume as a key figure in the Enlightenment. Blackburn (1996: 179). The following is edited material where I dealt with Hume within my Doctorate. I add more material for this article.
David Hume on Theodicy
David Hume (1779)(2004) discusses the danger of traditional superstition in religious presentations, Hume (1779)(2004: 7) and doubtless a reasonable, open-minded, philosophical approach from a theist would be far more helpful within a theodicy. He also warns against theistic claims of being able to adequately understand the Supreme Being, if there is one. Hume (1779)(2004: 21-27). This Being’s attributes would be ‘incomprehensible and it basically impossible for the theist to understand the nature of this being. Hume (1779)(2004: 21). If Hume is correct, constructing a theodicy would be largely meaningless. To counter this problem, Biblical Revelation would be required in order that God reveals self in context of the issue of theodicy.
May 29, 2011
Within my PhD research Augustine’s free will approach to theodicy made use of Scripture and yet was also philosophical. Plantinga’s free will defence was philosophical. Feinberg’s sovereignty theodicy was both Biblical and philosophical as was my sovereignty approach which was not formally presented separately but was basically embedded within my work. My project with the use of exemplars and my own earned expertise did not fall prey to Hume’s criticisms of constructing largely meaningless theodicy. This is not a claim of intellectual perfection by any means.
David Hume on God’s Sovereignty
Phillips explains that a Reformed view is that God has the freedom to act as he wants. Phillips (2005: 22). This would be God’s sovereign providence, but Hume is skeptical of this concept. Hume (1779)(2004: 50). People throughout the world view certain evils, which may be rectified in other regions of the world or in the future, and understand these good events as being connected to general laws and the existence of a good deity. Hume suggests that these are superstitions, and questions whether in many cases a ‘cause can be known but from its known effects?’ The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness. Hume (1779)(2004: 50).
May 29, 2011
This is the logical problem of evil. ‘The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness’. Much of the problem of evil and theodicy discussion within my thesis concerning free will, sovereignty, and soul-making presentations and atheistic counters concerns the logical problem of evil and also the gratuitous problem of evil. Other theses, books and articles may deal with various approaches, perhaps of other religions and worldviews. For example, hypothetically, evil could be denied as a reality.
Below is edited from previous work, but is a good summary of the major views to briefly answer Hume:
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe. Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26). Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labeled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130). I found Feinberg’s explanation of this a bit repetitive and it would perhaps be good for him to have speculated on God’s reasons for willingly allowing evil in more specific terms as I have to some degree in my work.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Plantinga successfully demonstrates that a free will defence is logical and reasonable. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). He speculates that the price of God creating a universe with significantly free creatures is that wrong actions will inevitably occur leading to the problem of evil. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Plantinga’s free will approach is not primarily theological as is Augustine’s and therefore offers a different but somewhat related perspective.
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe. Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26). Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labeled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130). I found Feinberg’s explanation of this a bit repetitive and it would perhaps be good for him to have speculated on God’s reasons for willingly allowing evil in more specific terms as I have to some degree in my work.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Plantinga successfully demonstrates that a free will defence is logical and reasonable. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). He speculates that the price of God creating a universe with significantly free creatures is that wrong actions will inevitably occur leading to the problem of evil. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Plantinga’s free will approach is not primarily theological as is Augustine’s and therefore offers a different but somewhat related perspective.
A question arises if Plantinga has really successfully answered the objection of theistic critics such as Feinberg, and atheists such as J.L. Mackie on why God could not simply create human beings who were significantly free and never committed wrong actions. I believe that God could have created significantly free human beings, or at least human-like creatures that only committed right actions. Perhaps God desired to create human beings that would ultimately posses a greater spiritual maturity than Adam and Eve prior to the fall because those restored in Christ would have experienced sin, the problem of evil, death and the atoning work and resurrection of Christ. Quite possibly restored human beings would ultimately be more spiritually mature and valuable to God than persons that never knew what it was like to disobey God and experience evil. I would also point out that Biblically speaking the angels that did not fall would seemingly be significantly free and have not committed wrong actions.
HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.
Hick rejects Augustinian and Calvinistic views on theodicy, and instead supports what he views as the Irenean position. Hick (1970: 221). Ramsay (2004: 2). Hick also rejects conservative Christian doctrines and instead favours the idea of universalism. Hick (1970: 172). Hick (1970: 381). He reasons that human beings were made immature and capable of committing wrong human actions in order that God eventually can bring all persons to the creator through soul-making. Hick (1970: 292). I can accept that some type of soul-making is used by God in the development of believers, but without the atoning work of Christ and resurrection within a Christian tradition we do not have a revealed divine means of salvation and are left to speculate on how God should or could save persons, as Hick speculates.
David Hume on Consciousness
Consciousness is not a new intellectual subject, as David Hume writes in the article A Treatise of Human Nature’ that most philosophers think personal identity begins with consciousness, which is reflected thought or perception. Although the exact nature of human consciousness is not known, it does work with human thought and perception. Hume found no theory of consciousness provided him with intellectual satisfaction. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) in Conversation with Burman, defined consciousness as the possible internal source of knowledge concerning a person’s own thoughts or mental occurrences. To have consciousness was to be able to understand one’s own thoughts.
I dealt with more philosophical/scientific journals in my PhD in regard to consciousness for post-viva revisions and documented some of the work in this post below. From my reading, academically consciousness and the related subject of desires, still lacked much intellectual clarity even as they were being studied within the fields of philosophy, religion, psychology and psychiatry.
Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD
HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.
Hick rejects Augustinian and Calvinistic views on theodicy, and instead supports what he views as the Irenean position. Hick (1970: 221). Ramsay (2004: 2). Hick also rejects conservative Christian doctrines and instead favours the idea of universalism. Hick (1970: 172). Hick (1970: 381). He reasons that human beings were made immature and capable of committing wrong human actions in order that God eventually can bring all persons to the creator through soul-making. Hick (1970: 292). I can accept that some type of soul-making is used by God in the development of believers, but without the atoning work of Christ and resurrection within a Christian tradition we do not have a revealed divine means of salvation and are left to speculate on how God should or could save persons, as Hick speculates.
David Hume on Consciousness
Consciousness is not a new intellectual subject, as David Hume writes in the article A Treatise of Human Nature’ that most philosophers think personal identity begins with consciousness, which is reflected thought or perception. Although the exact nature of human consciousness is not known, it does work with human thought and perception. Hume found no theory of consciousness provided him with intellectual satisfaction. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) in Conversation with Burman, defined consciousness as the possible internal source of knowledge concerning a person’s own thoughts or mental occurrences. To have consciousness was to be able to understand one’s own thoughts.
I dealt with more philosophical/scientific journals in my PhD in regard to consciousness for post-viva revisions and documented some of the work in this post below. From my reading, academically consciousness and the related subject of desires, still lacked much intellectual clarity even as they were being studied within the fields of philosophy, religion, psychology and psychiatry.
Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD
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BLOCHER, HENRI (1994) Evil and the Cross, Translated by David G. Preston, Leicester, InterVarsity Press.
DESCARTES, RENE (1648)(1996) Conversation with Burman, in Eric Lormand: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan.
GIERER, ALFRED (2003)‘Brain, mind, and limitations of a scientific theory of human consciousness’, Preprint of a contribution to the symposium: Proteus im Spiegel-Kritische Theorie des Subjekts im 20, Tubingen, Max-Planck-Institute Biology, Tubingen.
GUTMANN, JAMES (1845)(1936) ‘Introduction’ in SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.
HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.
AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.
AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.
AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BLACKBURN, SIMON
(1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BLOCHER, HENRI (1994) Evil and the Cross, Translated by David G. Preston, Leicester, InterVarsity Press.
DESCARTES, RENE (1648)(1996) Conversation with Burman, in Eric Lormand: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
GIERER, ALFRED (2003)‘Brain, mind, and limitations of a scientific theory of human consciousness’, Preprint of a contribution to the symposium: Proteus im Spiegel-Kritische Theorie des Subjekts im 20, Tubingen, Max-Planck-Institute Biology, Tubingen.
GUTMANN, JAMES (1845)(1936) ‘Introduction’ in SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.
HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.
HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.
HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.
HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.
HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.
HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.
HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Lawrence, Kansas.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
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Originally published 20110601 on Blogger, with slight edits 20251101 on Blogger for an entry on academia.edu
