Can God Create A Rock So Heavy He Cannot Lift
It?
Preface
Originally published on Blogger, 202130520, this is the main article sourced for an entry on academia.edu, 20250614.
I have never viewed this question as a
serious intellectual threat to theism or Christianity…
From my PhD
Humanist Simon Blackburn, from a
non-theistic critical perspective, reasons there are difficulties with the
concept of an omnipotent God not being able to make a stone so heavy he could
not lift it, as this would make God possibly contradictory[1]
but does explain that the classic explanation is that God cannot commit the logically
impossible.[2]
Baptist and Reformed theologian Millard Erickson writes that God cannot do any arbitrary thing he desires,[3] as he can only accomplish what is logical and not illogical and contradictory.[4] Erickson also reasons, interestingly, that God cannot undo the past,[5] although he may take away the effects and memory of it.[6] God cannot logically violate his own nature[7] or fail to live up to a promise.[8] Otto Weber suggests God has unlimited capacity[9] and unrestricted will.[10] God is unrestricted in what he determines within self and outside of self.[11] Presbyterian theologian John M. Frame admits the term omnipotence is not in Scripture,[12] but reasons the concept is Biblical.[13] He deduces that based on the Bible, it is impossible for anything to occur outside of what God has willed to happen.[14]
John Frame and D.Z. Phillips
The ‘all things’[15] God can accomplish does come with some need to interpret.[16] Frame explains that God cannot perform logically contradictory actions,[17] as in making a square circle,[18] committing that which is immoral and sinful,[19] and interestingly, God cannot commit actions ‘appropriate only to finite creatures.’[20] This would include ‘buying shoes’ and ‘taking medicine for a cough.’[21] Philosopher, D.Z. Phillips within The Problem of Evil and The Problem of God, disagrees with this basic notion and writes that since God cannot commit the actions of finite creatures such as ‘riding a bicycle’[22] he is not omnipotent.[23] Phillips reasons it is not logically contradictory for one to ride a bicycle and therefore God should be able to do it and yet he cannot.[24] Therefore, God is not omnipotent.[25]
One approach to Phillip’s argument[26] is to admit that God, as non-finite, cannot commit finite actions[27] and is therefore not omnipotent[28] as classically reasoned by many within traditional thought.[29] A second approach is in agreement with Frame’s point that even though God cannot by nature commit the actions of finite creatures,[30] this does not disqualify God as being omnipotent within his infinite nature.[31] God’s lack of finiteness is actually a strength.[32] Frame states God could commit the type of finite actions discussed if he so desired by taking human form.[33] I reason God could take human form to accomplish the task of riding a bicycle, as for example, God is stated in Genesis[34] to have walked and spoken[35] in the Garden of Eden.[36] Although I do not reason this is a ridiculous suggestion to deduce God could take bodily form[37] to walk or ride a bicycle,[38] it certainly would not be within God’s nature to typically ride a bicycle.[39]
Philips summarizes his view on God’s omnipotence in three points.[40] One, God would only be omnipotent if he could do anything that can be explained that is done without contradiction.[41] Two, he then reasons there are many countless activities that God without contradiction cannot do.[42] Three, his conclusion is that God is not omnipotent.[43] Philips’ view can be accepted as reasonable and for some God’s omnipotence would need to be redefined.[44] However, I reason Frame’s explanation adequately offers the points that God can only do what is logically possible[45] and as well what is not contrary to his infinite and spiritual nature.[46]
BLACKBURN, SIMON
(1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CAUTHEN, KENNETH
(1997) ‘Theodicy’, in Frontier.net,
Rochester, New York, Kenneth Cauthen,
Professor of Theology, Emeritus, Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School.
GRENZ, STANLEY
J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING
(1999) Pocket Dictionary of
Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.
ERICKSON,
MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology,
Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
ERICKSON,
MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and
When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids,
Zondervan.
FRAME, JOHN M.
(1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26;
5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online,
Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third
Millennium.
FRAME, JOHN M.
(2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R
Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.
PHILLIPS, D.Z.
(1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T.
Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z.
(2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
HAMILTON, VICTOR
P. (1988) Handbook on the Pentateuch,
Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
HUME, DAVID
(1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap
(eds.), A Modern Introduction To
Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.
HUME, DAVID
(1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media
LLC, Lawrence, Kansas.
LA SOR, WILLIAM
SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids,
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
SHEDD, WILLIAM
G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,
Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson
Publishers.
SHEDD, WILLIAM
G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,
Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson
Publishers.
THIESSEN, HENRY
C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in
Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
WEBER, OTTO
(1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes
1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company.
WRIGHT,
R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for
Sovereignty, Downers Grove,
Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
[1] Blackburn (1996:
268).
[2] Blackburn (1996:
268). William T. Shedd explains that God
cannot do what is ‘absurd and self-contradictory’. Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359 Volume 1).
[3] Erickson (1994:
277).
[4] Erickson (1994:
277). For Shedd a logical impossibility is a nonentity and God could not create
a nonentity. Shedd (1874-1890)(1980:
359-360 Volume 1).
[5] Erickson (1994:
277).
[6] Erickson (1994:
277). The implication being that God
could hypothetically change all the results of a past occurrence, but could not
logically make the past occurrence to have not occurred, even if only he had
any ultimate knowledge of it.
[7] Erickson (1994:
277). Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[8] Erickson (1994:
277).
[9] Weber (1955)(1981:
440).
[10] Weber (1955)(1981:
440).
[11] Weber (1955)(1981:
440).
[12] Frame (2002: 515).
[13] Frame (2002: 515).
[14] Frame (2002: 518).
Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[15] Frame (2002: 518).
[16] Frame (2002: 518).
[17] Frame (2002:
518). Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd
(1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).
[18] Frame (2002:
518). Thiessen (1956: 126).
[19] Frame (2002:
518). Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber
(1955)(1981: 440).
[20] Frame (2002: 520).
[21] Frame (2002: 520).
[22] Phillips (2005:
113).
[23] Phillips (2005:
113).
[24] Phillips (2005:
113).
[25] Phillips (2005:
113). For Philips, God’s inability to do finite things is a weakness making God
less than all-powerful. For Frame it is
a strength which maintains God as omnipotent.
Frame (2002: 520).
[26] Phillips (2005:
113).
[27] Frame (2002:
520). Phillips (2005: 113).
[28] Phillips (2005:
113).
[29] Cauthen (1997:
1). Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999:
85-86). Wright (1996: 278).
[30] Frame (2002:
520). Phillips (2005: 113).
[31] Frame (2002: 520). A traditional perspective would not view the lack of
finite nature of God as a negation, but God would be understood in the positive
sense as not lacking power by being infinite.
[32] Frame (2002: 520). With Phillips’ view, God could be considered less than
omnipotent with my own example I provide here, because it is not illogical for
a being to sleep, and God cannot sleep.
However, it could be stated that it is a strength for God to not need to
sleep or be able to sleep.
[33] Frame (2002:
520). Phillips would more than likely
view this as an ‘absurd suggestion’ with no contextual warrant, as he describes
similar attempts to counter his argument.
Phillips (2005: 113).
[34] Genesis 3: 8 in
The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 4).
[35] Old Testament
scholar Victor P. Hamilton reasons this could be taken from a literal (to some
degree) reading. Hamilton (1982: 48).
[36] I realize there is
debate on the creation story in Genesis concerning whether it is to be taken as
plain literal, figurative literal, myth or a combination of approaches. La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush reason there is
definitely metaphorical language in Genesis. La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush (1987:
72). My example does serve well as
agreement with Frame’s point, however.
Aspects of Genesis will be further discussed within this thesis.
[37] Hamilton (1982:
48).
[38] Phillips (2005:
113).
[39] Phillips (2005:
113).
[40] Philips (2005:
11).
[41] Philips (2005:
11).
[42] Philips (2005:
11). Frame (2002: 518-520). I of course offered Frame’s response to this
view, and my own.
[43] Philips (2005:
11).
[44] Traditional
perspectives would still reason that God’s omnipotence need not be redefined as
a lack of finiteness would demonstrate God’s lack of impotency.
[45] Frame (2002:
518). Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd
(1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1). Blackburn (1996: 268).
[46] Frame (2002:
520). Erickson (1994: 277). Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber (1955)(1981: 440). David Hume within Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
questions this traditional understanding of an omnipotent supreme being as
human limitations make God’s attributes ‘totally incomprehensible.’ Hume (1779)(2004: 21).
