Saturday, June 28, 2025

Erasmus (ca.1466-1536) PhD Edit: Satire Und Theology Version

Brightsidedotme: Amsterdam
Erasmus (ca.1466-1536) PhD Edit

May 5, 2020

My History, professor at Trinity Western University and Canadian Baptist Seminary, Dr. Ken Davis, a very knowledgeable historian (paraphrased) stated that Erasmus was a brilliant scholar that was not reasonably and fairly reviewed by Martin Luther in their debate; nor was Erasmus reviewed fairly by history on the debate. 

This work was previously presented in regards to Martin Luther, (link below) but this time Erasmus is the scholar in focus and with new material focused on Erasmus.

British philosopher, Blackburn writes that Erasmus (from Holland/Netherlands) was one of the earliest and greatest humanists of the Northern Renaissance. (124) Erasmus was a moderate and his moderate sceptism (124) gave him no reasonable place within the increasingly divisive Christian Church of his era. (124). However, his classical learning and teachings did have historical influence. (124).

His moderate views may have run afoul of the less than moderate views of Martin Luther.

The Pocket Dictionary explains Erasmus as a ‘major figure of the Reformation period’. (45). A humanist that sought reform for the Church through scholarly study in Scripture and Greek and Latin classical cultures. (45-46). The Pocket Dictionary opines that Erasmus influenced Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin in the interpretation of the New Testament through the original Greek manuscripts and texts. (46) This assisted in their theological development within the Reformation. (46).

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

In 1525 Luther wrote The Bondage of the Will, which was a debate with a Catholic scholar named Desiderius Erasmus (ca.1466-1536)[1] who was an advocate of the free will theory.[2] Luther reasons that since human beings were fallen and abandoned God, they could not will good but only turned in the direction of their own desires.[3] He comments that human beings were perverted and evil,[4] but this can be used by God for his purposes, although people can do nothing but oppose God by the use of their own will.[5] He dogmatically assumes that there is no middle way between God’s grace and human free will,[6] and postulates that human free will should be theologically denied and everything should be ascribed to God.[7]

Luther’s sovereignty perspective[8] may place less emphasis on the human will than the later writings of Calvin and Feinberg. However, even the title of Luther’s book The Bondage of the Will shows that he likely influenced Calvin somewhat in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will. Jay Green writes that Luther can be viewed as an early and continual influence on Calvinism,[9] and it is reasonable to deduce that Luther is perhaps a minor historical influence on Feinberg’s sovereignty theology.[10] Green points out that Luther’s views on theistic determinism are only accepted by a minority of Calvinists today.[11] 

June 28 2025

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Desiderius Erasmus 2017-2021 

Cited 

'Considered a forerunner of the Reformation by his contemporaries, he broke with Martin Luther over the latter’s sectarianism. More fundamentally, the two men disagreed over heuristics and engaged in a polemic over the question of free will. Erasmus took a skeptical position vis-à-vis Luther’s assertions. Unlike the reformer, he did not believe in the clarity of Scripture and used consensus and tradition as criteria to settle questions that did not allow a rational conclusion. Erasmus rarely ventured into doctrinal questions, however, favoring simple faith and devotion over dialectics and scholastic speculation. The circulation of Erasmus’ works was temporarily curtailed when the Catholic Church put them on the Index of Forbidden Books, but his ideas saw a revival during the Enlightenment when he was regarded as a forerunner of rationalism. His most famous work, The Praise of Folly, has remained in print to the present day, a distinction shared by few books from the 16th century.'

Referenced on that website 

Erasmus’ Works For a repertory of individual works and their early editions, see Ferdinand Van der Haeghen, Bibliotheca Erasmiana: Répertoire des oeuvres d’Erasme (first published 1897, most recent reprinted Würzburg: Osthoff, 2005). 

Erasmus’ Opera Omnia were first published in Basel: Froben, 1540. The arrangement of works adopted there has become the model for later editions. An authoritative critical edition (ASD) and an English translation (CWE) of his works are ongoing. 

[Allen] Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami, 12 vols., edited by P.S. Allen and others, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1906–1958. doi:10.1093/actrade/9780198203414.book.1 

[ASD] Opera Omnia Des. Erasmi Roterodami, (no primary editor), Amsterdam: North Holland Press, 1969–. In 9 ordines or categories, each of which has multiple volumes. 

[CWE] The Collected Works of Erasmus, (no primary editor), Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974–. 

[LB] Opera Omnia Des. Erasmi Roterodami, 10 vols. Leiden: Peter van der Aa, 1703–1706. 

Texts not (or not yet) included in these editions: 

Ferguson, Wallace K. (ed.), Erasmi Opuscula. A Supplement to the Opera Omnia, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1933. 

[Holborn] Holborn, Hajo and Annemarie Holborn (eds.), Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus: Ausgewählte Werke, Munich: Beck, 1933.
---

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CAIRNS, EARLE E. (1981) Christianity Through The Centuries, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

ERASMUS. (1525)(1972) ‘The Bondage of the Will’, in F.W. Strothmann and Frederick W. Locke (eds.), Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., INC.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREEN, JAY (1971) Five Points of Calvinism, ‘Forward’, Grand Rapids, Sovereign Grace Publishers.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1516)(1968) Commentary On The Epistle To The Romans, Translated by J.Theodore Mueller, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1518)(1989) ‘Heidelberg Disputation’, in Timothy F. Lull (ed.), Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings,  Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1525)(1972) ‘The Bondage of the Will’, in F.W. Strothmann and Frederick W. Locke (eds.), Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., INC. 



[1] Cairns (1981: 263).
[2] Erasmus (1525)(1972: 20).
[3] Luther (1525)(1972: 128-130).
[4] Luther (1525)(1972: 128-130).
[5] Luther (1525)(1972: 128-130).
[6] Luther is far more forceful in presentation that is Calvin and especially Feinberg.  He is very forceful in his debate with Erasmus.  I would provide the opinion that he seems closed-minded.
[7] Luther (1525)(1972: 133).
[8] Luther (1525)(1972: 123).
[9] Green (1971: 7).
[10] Feinberg is far more sympathetic to differing viewpoints than is Luther.
[11] Green (1971: 7).
---


Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

A version of this Blogger article placed on academia.edu 20250628.


Saturday, June 21, 2025

Greg Welty on sinless humanity III (PhD Edit): Satire Und Theology Version

Greg Welty on sinless humanity III (PhD Edit)

Preface

Photo: Is an abstract photo from a Munich bus tour I took, 20250406.

This Blogger version of this article is for an entry on academia.edu, 20250621. This includes PhD and website work. Short and non-exhaustive.

Greg Welty on sinless humanity III (PhD Edit)

Welty rejects Plantinga’s idea that God cannot create a world containing moral good and no moral evil,[1] and raises the objection that God brought Christ into the world as a sinless human being.[2] Welty’s point here is that every human being could have therefore been sinless[3] and the world could contain good and no evil with significantly free human beings that would not commit wrong actions.[4] I have a similar objection to Welty’s,[5] which was discussed in Chapters Two and Three of my PhD thesis. Within my theodicy, I reason that God could have, if he wished, made significantly free human beings, or human like beings who would have been perfectly morally good and would not commit wrong actions.[6] God’s choice not to create such beings, in my mind is not a sign of a lack of power, or moral failure, but rather the use of his own perfect and significantly free will for good purposes.  


[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).  Welty (1999: 1).
[2] Welty (1999: 1).
[3] Welty (1999: 1).
[4] Welty (1999: 1).
[5] Welty (1999: 1).
[6] This is an aspect of compatibilism, which shall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD  

Website work

I make the theological deduction that biblically, the loyal angels of God, that did not turn from God, had (have) significantly free natures, which includes desire and will. These angels have not committed wrong actions. I reason significantly free beings can be made perfect, holy and good gaining knowledge of good and evil and do not choose evil and do not require the option to choose evil. Therefore, fallen humanity as is and the atonement and resurrection work of Christ as applied to those chosen and elect in Christ is part of God’s sovereign plans. As is the culminated Kingdom of God with the new heaven and new earth (Revelation 20-22). 

It is an eternal plan of God that some within humanity will be regenerated (notably John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1), justified (the righteousness of Christ applied to believers) and sanctified (set apart in holiness) in salvation and some will not. This being God's perfect will. Christ is the lamb slain from the foundation (foundations also works theologically) of the world (Revelation 13: 8, see also Revelation 5 for related).

Revelation 3: 5

English Standard Version (ESV) 5 The one who conquers will be clothed thus in white garments, and I will never blot his name out of the book of life. I will confess his name before my Father and before his angel

The gospel and the applied atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ, are part of God's eternal plans, as are those whose names are within the book of life.

Ephesians 1: 3-4

Ephesians 1:3-4 New American Standard Bible (NASB) 3 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ, 4 just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before [a]Him. In love Footnotes: (a) Ephesians 1:4 Or Him, in love

God's eternal plan as the first and primary cause, included a human sin, fall and rebellion. This implies significantly free creatures that will sin, is the eternal plan which makes sense as Christ is the lamb slain from the foundation/foundations of the world, in other words, the atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, Jesus Christ, applied to those chosen is an eternal triune, plan. Persons are morally accountable for sin as secondary causes, as long as they are not forced or coerced to do so, and therefore those not within the Kingdom of God, post-mortem, with limited free will, embrace their exclusion.

God's perfect will is that this temporal, temporary realm exists, but to be clear, I still reason that many human sinful, acts and actions are allowed within his permissible will.

I reason that Welty's argument is very strong for compatibilism versus incompatibilism. Jesus Christ as incarnate was both infinite God and finite man. As finite man he lived in sinless life and yet had significant freedom, and successfully faced and rejected temptation. Christ completed his atoning and resurrection work for those in Christ, via a divine gospel plan with persons as is within this present realm.

The angels that did not fall (Revelation 12) are non-physical beings reasoned to have remained sinless and yet have significant freedom, as they are judged (1 Corinthians 6, fallen angels in Revelation 20). The divine judgement for thoughts and actions of a secondary cause requires moral accountability, otherwise this is hard determinism, where only God the primary cause would be morally responsible, although with perfect and holy motives. This is not soft-determinism/compatibilism.

God, as infinite and eternal has never contradicted his divine nature (logically cannot) and sinned and yet has significant freedom. 
In the cases of the human nature of Jesus Christ, the finite nature of angels that stayed true to God and the infinite nature of God, there is a significant, reasonable understanding of evil (God's being infinite) but not an ontological/nature requirement of embracing evil and sin as an option. If one's nature is perfectly good, finitely or infinitely, it is logically possible and reasonable to stay in that nature while understanding evil. An entity can be finitely morally perfect and remain so, it does not the require the option to turn from God, although it remains a logical possibility. It is not logically possible for the infinite God to contradict his infinite nature. God cannot contradict God in nature.
---

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRUCE, F.F. (1986) ‘Revelation’, in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

WELTY, GREG (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Greg Welty PhD, Fort Worth, Texas. Philosophy Department, Southwestern Baptist Theological  Seminary.  
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/probevil.htm

Related articles

Monday, March 10, 2014 Greg Welty And Christ As Sinless Human Being (PhD Edit) 


Saturday, June 14, 2025

Can God Create A Rock So Heavy He Cannot Lift It? (PhD Edit): Satire Und Theology Version

Can God Create A Rock So Heavy He Cannot Lift It?

Preface

Originally published on Blogger, 202130520, this is the main article sourced for an entry on academia.edu, 20250614.

I have never viewed this question as a serious intellectual threat to theism or Christianity…

From my PhD


Humanist Simon Blackburn, from a non-theistic critical perspective, reasons there are difficulties with the concept of an omnipotent God not being able to make a stone so heavy he could not lift it, as this would make God possibly contradictory[1] but does explain that the classic explanation is that God cannot commit the logically impossible.[2]
            
Baptist and Reformed theologian Millard Erickson writes that God cannot do any arbitrary thing he desires,[3] as he can only accomplish what is logical and not illogical and contradictory.[4]  Erickson also reasons, interestingly, that God cannot undo the past,[5] although he may take away the effects and memory of it.[6] God cannot logically violate his own nature[7] or fail to live up to a promise.[8]  Otto Weber suggests God has unlimited capacity[9] and unrestricted will.[10]  God is unrestricted in what he determines within self and outside of self.[11] Presbyterian theologian John M. Frame admits the term omnipotence is not in Scripture,[12] but reasons the concept is Biblical.[13]  He deduces that based on the Bible, it is impossible for anything to occur outside of what God has willed to happen.[14] 

John Frame and D.Z. Phillips
           
The ‘all things’[15] God can accomplish does come with some need to interpret.[16]  Frame explains that God cannot perform logically contradictory actions,[17] as in making a square circle,[18] committing that which is immoral and sinful,[19] and interestingly, God cannot commit actions ‘appropriate only to finite creatures.’[20]  This would include ‘buying shoes’ and ‘taking medicine for a cough.’[21]  Philosopher, D.Z. Phillips within The Problem of Evil and The Problem of God, disagrees with this basic notion and writes that since God cannot commit the actions of finite creatures such as ‘riding a bicycle’[22] he is not omnipotent.[23]  Phillips reasons it is not logically contradictory for one to ride a bicycle and therefore God should be able to do it and yet he cannot.[24]  Therefore, God is not omnipotent.[25]
            
One approach to Phillip’s argument[26] is to admit that God, as non-finite, cannot commit finite actions[27] and is therefore not omnipotent[28] as classically reasoned by many within traditional thought.[29]  A second approach is in agreement with Frame’s point that even though God cannot by nature commit the actions of finite creatures,[30] this does not disqualify God as being omnipotent within his infinite nature.[31] God’s lack of finiteness is actually a strength.[32] Frame states God could commit the type of finite actions discussed if he so desired by taking human form.[33]  I reason God could take human form to accomplish the task of riding a bicycle, as for example, God is stated in Genesis[34] to have walked and spoken[35] in the Garden of Eden.[36] Although I do not reason this is a ridiculous suggestion to deduce God could take bodily form[37] to walk or ride a bicycle,[38] it certainly would not be within God’s nature to typically ride a bicycle.[39]
            
Philips summarizes his view on God’s omnipotence in three points.[40]  One, God would only be omnipotent if he could do anything that can be explained that is done without contradiction.[41]  Two, he then reasons there are many countless activities that God without contradiction cannot do.[42]  Three, his conclusion is that God is not omnipotent.[43]  Philips’ view can be accepted as reasonable and for some God’s omnipotence would need to be redefined.[44]  However, I reason Frame’s explanation adequately offers the points that God can only do what is logically possible[45] and as well what is not contrary to his infinite and spiritual nature.[46]

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CAUTHEN, KENNETH (1997) ‘Theodicy’, in Frontier.net, Rochester, New York, Kenneth Cauthen, Professor of Theology, Emeritus, Colgate Rochester Crozer Divinity School.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING  (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?,  Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.),  Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005)  The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

HAMILTON, VICTOR P. (1988) Handbook on the Pentateuch, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004)  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence, Kansas. 

LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WEBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WRIGHT, R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for Sovereignty,  Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.



[1] Blackburn (1996: 268).
[2] Blackburn (1996: 268).  William T. Shedd explains that God cannot do what is ‘absurd and self-contradictory’.  Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359 Volume 1).
[3] Erickson (1994: 277).
[4] Erickson (1994: 277). For Shedd a logical impossibility is a nonentity and God could not create a nonentity.  Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).
[5] Erickson (1994: 277).
[6] Erickson (1994: 277).  The implication being that God could hypothetically change all the results of a past occurrence, but could not logically make the past occurrence to have not occurred, even if only he had any ultimate knowledge of it.
[7] Erickson (1994: 277).  Thiessen (1956: 126).  Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[8] Erickson (1994: 277).
[9] Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[10] Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[11] Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[12] Frame (2002: 515).
[13] Frame (2002: 515).
[14] Frame (2002: 518). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[15] Frame (2002: 518).
[16] Frame (2002: 518).
[17] Frame (2002: 518).  Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).
[18] Frame (2002: 518).  Thiessen (1956: 126).
[19] Frame (2002: 518).  Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[20] Frame (2002: 520).
[21] Frame (2002: 520).
[22] Phillips (2005: 113).
[23] Phillips (2005: 113).
[24] Phillips (2005: 113).
[25] Phillips (2005: 113). For Philips, God’s inability to do finite things is a weakness making God less than all-powerful.  For Frame it is a strength which maintains God as omnipotent.  Frame (2002: 520). 
[26] Phillips (2005: 113).
[27] Frame (2002: 520).  Phillips (2005: 113).
[28] Phillips (2005: 113).
[29] Cauthen (1997: 1).  Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 85-86).  Wright (1996: 278).
[30] Frame (2002: 520).  Phillips (2005: 113).
[31] Frame (2002: 520).  A traditional perspective would not view the lack of finite nature of God as a negation, but God would be understood in the positive sense as not lacking power by being infinite.
[32] Frame (2002: 520).  With Phillips’ view, God could be considered less than omnipotent with my own example I provide here, because it is not illogical for a being to sleep, and God cannot sleep.  However, it could be stated that it is a strength for God to not need to sleep or be able to sleep.
[33] Frame (2002: 520).  Phillips would more than likely view this as an ‘absurd suggestion’ with no contextual warrant, as he describes similar attempts to counter his argument.  Phillips (2005: 113).
[34] Genesis 3: 8 in The New American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 4). 
[35] Old Testament scholar Victor P. Hamilton reasons this could be taken from a literal (to some degree) reading. Hamilton (1982: 48).
[36] I realize there is debate on the creation story in Genesis concerning whether it is to be taken as plain literal, figurative literal, myth or a combination of approaches.  La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush reason there is definitely metaphorical language in Genesis. La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush (1987: 72).  My example does serve well as agreement with Frame’s point, however.  Aspects of Genesis will be further discussed within this thesis.
[37] Hamilton (1982: 48).
[38] Phillips (2005: 113).
[39] Phillips (2005: 113).
[40] Philips (2005: 11).
[41] Philips (2005: 11).
[42] Philips (2005: 11).  Frame (2002: 518-520).   I of course offered Frame’s response to this view, and my own. 
[43] Philips (2005: 11). 
[44] Traditional perspectives would still reason that God’s omnipotence need not be redefined as a lack of finiteness would demonstrate God’s lack of impotency.
[45] Frame (2002: 518).  Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume 1).  Blackburn (1996: 268). 
[46] Frame (2002: 520).   Erickson (1994: 277).  Thiessen (1956: 126).  Weber (1955)(1981: 440).  David Hume within Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion questions this traditional understanding of an omnipotent supreme being as human limitations make God’s attributes ‘totally incomprehensible.’  Hume (1779)(2004: 21).