Saturday, December 06, 2025

Irenaeus and John Hick (PhD Edit): Satire Und Theology Version

Irenaeus and John Hick (PhD Edit)

Preface

Photo: Notre-Dame, Lyon France (trekearth)

Irenaeus was a Priest in Lyon, France


A section from my PhD thesis. Slight edits and revision for an article on academia.edu 20251206.

Irenaeus

It is widely accepted that Hick is writing a theodicy within the Irenean tradition.[1] To Hick, Irenaeus believed God’s creation of humanity was the initial stage in a process that would lead to persons ultimately possessing the likeness of God.[2] Hick quotes Irenaeus in Against Heresies where humanity, in its original state is called immature.[3] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005) in Against Heresies deduces that God could have made humanity originally perfect, but the newness and immaturity of his actual creation made it impossible to grant.[4]

In Proof of Apostolic Preaching (c185)(2005), Irenaeus notes that human beings were as children in the beginning and were easily led astray by the deceiver.[5] A child as such is immature and needs to grow towards perfection.[6] Hick agrees with these concepts and suggests that the approach of Irenaeus is a rejection of the Augustinian idea of a fall in which human beings are viewed as morally perfect beings who rebelled against God.[7] Instead, humanity in a child-like way wandered away from the rule of their creator in a rather innocent fashion.[8] According to Hick, for Irenaeus the breaking away of God’s children from their creator was not so much a crime, but a youthful error,[9] and Hick views this process as a divinely appointed situation for human beings to develop towards the ultimate likeness of God.[10]

It seems clear that Hick and Irenaeus are in agreement that original humanity was spiritually and morally immature.[11] There does, however, appear in Ireneaus’ writings the idea of a loss of moral right standing with God due to an initial disobedience. Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998) writes, that the disobedience of one man caused many to become sinners and forfeit life, so it was needed for one man to justify and provide salvation to all.[12] This seems to support the possibility Irenaeus believed in original sin that occurred as human beings disobeyed God for the first time.[13] Original sin historically views persons as being born alienated from God,[14] assuming that the sin nature of the literal and historical Adam and Eve has spread to all descendents.[15] Calvin reasonably claims solidarity with Augustine’s view,[16] and indicates that the consequences of original sin means persons do not have the power to resist, as the will is in bondage until set free.[17] Augustine writes there is a ‘chain of original sin’ by which persons die in Adam.[18] He adds that in this condition, persons were born into misery.[19] Erickson suggests that due to Adam’s sin, all human beings received a corrupted nature,[20] and this is viewed as the imputation of original sin to persons.[21] All persons are not personally responsible for Adam’s sin, but all have inherited a corrupt nature.[22]

The doctrine of original sin is related to the fall concept and is viewed by many traditionalists as being a result of the fall.[23] The fall has already been discussed within Chapters Two and Three and therefore an extended discussion of the subject would be redundant. Gebara has a non-traditional perspective and cautiously suggests that original sin could be the somber experience of the transcendence and immanence of evil permeating through existence.[24] With this view evil could be the sin that engulfs all of God’s creation.[25] F.R. Tennant (1906) rejects a traditional doctrine of original sin[26] as he writes that the doctrine is self-condemned as the idea involves original guilt.[27] He reasons that guilt is only applicable to someone who has willingly committed an act,[28] and I would agree. I do not think that all human beings are guilty of the sin of Adam and Eve, or if one prefers, the first persons that disobeyed God.[29] I accept the doctrine of original sin in that the corrupted nature of humanity will inevitably lead to the human choice to commit wrong actions.[30] Tennant’s concept is to reject hypothetical prior causes of ‘sin’[31] and instead views human evil as the normal process of development that takes place in the human race.[32] Moral law would need to be established as humanity gradually develops over centuries.[33]

If Adam and Eve (my view), or the first human beings, disobeyed God and humanity became sinful in Irenaeus’ theology,[34] this means previously persons were not sinful and had been acceptable in the presence of God.[35] In Proof of Apostolic Preaching as previously noted, humanity is described in terms of children that were led astray by the deceiver.[36] They were influenced and transformed from a position of being right with God morally, to a position of being at a wrong place morally with God.[37] This indicates that Irenaeus believed human beings lost their original glorious place of stature and fellowship with God, although not a fall from a perfect, mature righteousness, but rather a departure from living in obedience to God.[38] For Irenaeus, through human disobedience, Adam and Eve were no longer acceptable to live in God’s Eden and were cast out.[39] If Irenaeus did not agree with the Augustinian position concerning the original perfect sinless nature of humanity,[40] he at least seemingly would agree that human beings had lost their moral position and right standing with their maker.[41] Harvard Professor, Everett Ferguson (1996) in his article ‘Irenaeus’ claims Irenaeus believed that what was lost in the disobedience because of the first Adam, was restored through the second Adam, Jesus Christ.[42] This again appears to make it possible that although Irenaeus and Hick have a similar view on the original immaturity of humanity,[43] that to Irenaeus the first human beings lost a right standing with God because of disobedience,[44] forfeiting a life of abundance with God.[45] Clearly it is plausible that Irenaeus would view this as some type of fall or departure from grace.[46] This does not mean that Irenaeus held to an Augustinian view of the fall,[47] but it appears Irenaeus understood human beings as being morally inferior to what they were previous to their initial sin against God.[48]



[1] Badham (2003: 27).

[2] Hick (1970: 218). Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2).

[3] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2).

[4] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2).

[5] Irenaeus (c 185)(2005: 14).

[6] Irenaeus (c 185)(2005: 14).

[7] Hick in Davis (2001: 40).

[8] Hick (1970: 220-221).

[9] Hick (1970: 220-221).

[10] Hick in Davis (2001: 41).

[11] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2). Hick (1970: 218).

[12] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[13] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[14] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 87).

[15] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 87).

[16] Calvin (1543)(1996: 105).

[17] Calvin (1543)(1996: 105).

[18] Augustine (398-399)(1992: 82).

[19] Augustine (398-399)(1992: 197).

[20] Erickson (1994: 638).

[21] Erickson (1994: 638).

[22] Erickson (1994: 638).

[23] Erickson (1994: 915). Thiessen (1956: 253).

[24] Gebara (2002: 58-59).

[25] Gebara (2002: 58-59).

[26] Tennant (1906: 20).

[27] Tennant (1906: 20).

[28] Tennant (1906: 20).

[29] Tennant (1906: 20).

[30] Augustine (398-399)(1992: 82). Erickson (1994: 638).

[31] Tennant (1906: 20).

[32] Tennant (1906: 81).

[33] Tennant (1906: 81).

[34] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[35] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[36] Irenaeus (c.185-2005: 14).

[37] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[38] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[39] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[40] Hick’s conjecture.

[41] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[42] Ferguson (1996: 569).

[43] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2). Hick (1970: 218).

[44] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[45] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[46] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

[47] It may be closer to an Augustinian view than John Hick would be willing to admit.

[48] Irenaeus (c.175-185)(1998: Book III, Chapter 18: 7).

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AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BADHAM, PAUL (2003) ‘Profile: John Hick’, in Epworth Review, Volume 30, Number 1, pp. 24-31. Peterborough, England, Methodist Publishing House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FERGUSON, EVERETT (1996) ‘Irenaeus’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GEBARA, IVONE (2002) Out of the Depths, Translated by Ann Patrick Ware, Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

IRENAEUS. (c 175-185)(1998) ‘Against Heresies’, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

IRENAEUS. (c 175-185)(2005) Against Heresies, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

IRENAEUS (c 185)(2005) Proof of Apostolic Preaching, Translated by J. Armitage Robinson, London, The Macmillan CO.

TENNANT, F.R. (1906) The Origin and Propagation of Sin, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

TENNANT, F.R. (1930)(1956) Philosophical Theology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

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Website work 

Photo: Saint Nizier d Azergues, Lyon

New Advent

St. Irenaeus: New Advent

'Bishop of Lyons, and Father of the Church.

Information as to his life is scarce, and in some measure inexact. He was born in Proconsular Asia, or at least in some province bordering thereon, in the first half of the second century; the exact date is controverted, between the years 115 and 125, according to some, or, according to others, between 130 and 142. It is certain that, while still very young, Irenaeus had seen and heard the holy Bishop Polycarp (d. 155) at Smyrna. During the persecution of Marcus Aurelius, Irenaeus was a priest of the Church of Lyons. The clergy of that city, many of whom were suffering imprisonment for the Faith, sent him (177 or 178) to Rome with a letter to Pope Eleutherius concerning Montanism, and on that occasion bore emphatic testimony to his merits. Returning to Gaul, Irenaeus succeeded the martyr Saint Pothinus as Bishop of Lyons. During the religious peace which followed the persecution of Marcus Aurelius, the new bishop divided his activities between the duties of a pastor and of a missionary (as to which we have but brief data, late and not very certain) and his writings, almost all of which were directed against Gnosticism, the heresy then spreading in Gaul and elsewhere. In 190 or 191 he interceded with Pope Victor to lift the sentence of excommunication laid by that pontiff upon the Christian communities of Asia Minor which persevered in the practice of the Quartodecimans in regard to the celebration of Easter. Nothing is known of the date of his death, which must have occurred at the end of the second or the beginning of the third century. In spite of some isolated and later testimony to that effect, it is not very probable that he ended his career with martyrdom. His feast is celebrated on 28 June in the Latin Church, and on 23 August in the Greek.' 

End citation

New Advent sources

Poncelet, A. (1910). St. Irenaeus. In The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08130b.htm 

Nihil Obstat. October 1, 1910. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York. 

The editor of New Advent is Kevin Knight
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20251206

The late John Hick (1922-2012) was a major exemplar I used for my PhD thesis and is known for writing a Soul-Making Theodicy, which in my opinion, is also a Soul-Building Theodicy. Hick's approach is a liberal theistic approach. It is widely accepted that Hick was writing a theodicy within the Irenean tradition.[1] Badham (2003: 27). 

It seems clear that Hick and Irenaeus were in agreement with each other that original humanity was spiritually and morally immature.[11] Irenaeus (c 175-185)(2005: Book IV: Chapter 39: 2). Hick (1970: 218). Irenaeus and John Hick both believed that original humanity had immaturity, were inexperienced, and had a child-like nature. I can agree with the immaturity and lack of experience from Adam and Eve from my Reformed theological perspective and I reason it did play a part in their sinning and therefore falling from their standing with God. I would not use the term child-like, as they were created by God as fully adult, as implied from Scripture. I will presume they had adult brain function and processing, but still lacked maturity and experience. 

However, John Hick did not believe in the theology of original sin, while Irenaeus, although widely considered as not being from an Augustinian perceptive, did hold to a belief in original sin. Irenaeus reasoned that the human fall from God's presence from sin, did occur, which would be in agreement with biblical and Augustinian perspectives. John Hick disagreed with original sin theology, which is within biblical, Augustinian and Irenean perspectives. 

Friday, November 28, 2025

The Truth of the Proposition: Satire Und Theology Version

Macintosh
The Truth of the Proposition

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy)

Preface

The continuation of text review:

Key symbols

≡df = Equivalence by definition
: = Equal (s)
ε = Epsilon and means is
⊃ = Is the same as
⊨ is Entails
˜ = Not
∃ = There exists
∃! = There exists
∴ = Therefore
· = Therefore
= Is included
v = a logical inclusive disjunction (disjunction is the relationship between two distinct alternatives).
x = variable
· = Conjunction meaning And
0 = Null class
cls = Class
int = Interpretation
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Previously

Langer explains that a proposition can only be known via another proposition. (183). Implication is a relation that only holds among propositions. (183). Propositions are regarded as postulates. (185). A postulate needs to belong to the system, in the language of that system. A postulate should imply further propositions of that system. A postulate should not contradict any other accepted postulate, or any other proposition implied by another postulate. (185).

In other words, symbolic logic requires non-contradiction within its system in a universe of discourse.

Requirements

Coherence: Every proposition in the system must cohere to the established conceptual structure. (185). It must be in coherence with the rest.

Contributiveness : A postulate should contribute and have implication. (185-186).

Consistency: Most important states Langer (186). Two contradictory propositions (or premises) cannot contradict each other in a system. (186). The inconsistent is logically impossible. It is a fatal condition. (186). It is not logic at all. (186).

Independence: Postulates should be independent from each other. (186). If a proposition is deductible from a postulate already provided, then it is a theorem, a necessary fact, not another assumption. (186). Something provable in a theorem would be error to include as a postulate. (186). I would reason that within philosophy there would be plenty of debate on what is a proposition/premise within systems and what would be a theorem. Langer explains that when a theorem needs elucidation, any proposition implied by another proposition as granted and proved within a system is a theorem. (186-187).
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The Truth of the Proposition

Philosopher Langer writes that in the book, so far, nothing had been mentioned in regard to the truth of a proposition. (188). An implied proposition is true if all the premises are true. (188). The implied proposition could also be defined as the conclusion. If the premises are false, she opines that the proposition may or may not be true. (188).

There can be false premises and a true conclusion for a valid argument, but there cannot be true premise (s) and false conclusion with validity.

Validity is a set of premises supporting a conclusion. Technically in logic the premises do not have to be true, simply valid. Elements (1997: 33).

Therefore a valid deductive argument can have

False premises and a true conclusion (FT)

False premises and a false conclusion (FF)

True premises and a true conclusion (TT)

However

True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid.

Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments. These include a true conclusion.

Langer explains

Brutus killed Caesar ⊃ Caesar is dead. (188). (⊃ is means the same as).

Since the implied premise is true the proposition is also true (consequent). (188). Blackburn explains 'Any proposition of the form 'if p then q'. The condition hypothesized, p, is called the antecedent of the conditional, and q the consequent'. Blackburn (1996: 73).

If

Brutus killed Caesar ˜ ⊃ (Brutus did not kill Caesar) Caesar is dead  (my equation using not the same)

This would not change the implication that Caesar was dead. (188). Brutus did not kill Caesar; Caesar died in another way.

Brutus fatally stabbed Caesar ∴ (therefore) Caesar is dead

Brutus murdered Caesar ⊨ (entails) Caesar is dead
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BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.
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An entry was placed on academia.edu with additions on 20251128

Saturday, November 22, 2025

Panentheism Revisited: Satire Und Theology Version

Panentheism Revisited

Preface

London, Greenwich (trekearth.com)

An article which compiles some previous articles on panentheism for a new entry on Blogger and an entry on academia.edu.

Panentheism 

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Process theism approaches are sometimes referred to as being panentheistic.[1] The two approaches are not identical but process theism moves in the direction of panentheism.[2] David H. Nikkel (2003) defines panentheism as from the Greek meaning ‘all is in God.’[3] Both God’s transcendence and immanence are accepted, as the world and matter is in God, and God is ‘all-encompassing with respect to being.’[4] Panentheism is not identical to pantheism which postulates that ‘God is identical with everything’[5] or that God is in everything and that God and the universe are one.[6] The difference being that panentheism understands ‘God is in all things’[7] but not identical with all things as with pantheism.[8] As example, God in pantheism may be considered to be equal with a tree. God in panentheism may be considered beyond the tree, but the vital force within it, where as in my traditional Christian theistic understanding God is beyond a tree and sustains it, but is not the vital force within it.[9] Panentheism attempts to ‘avoid the pitfalls’ of traditional theism.[10] God is prohibited from having a true and genuine relationship with matter and the universe because of traditional theistic views such as that God is immutable, impassible, and eternal and timeless.[11] Panentheism is an intellectual compromise between traditional theism and pantheism.[12] God is more than just the material universe, as there is an unchanging aspect to God’s being and also a dynamic aspect to God as the divine being changes as matter and the universe do.[13] German philosopher, F.W. J. Schelling [14] (1845)(1936) reasons: ‘As there is nothing before or outside of God, he must contain within himself the ground of his existence.’[15] He reasons God’s nature is inseparable from God and yet can be distinguished.[16] Panentheism can reasonably be understood as an overarching view within many process theism approaches[17] which I have contrasted with my own views.[18] 

________________

[1] Geisler (1975: 153).

[2] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 142). I am not stating that this is the case in every documented view of process theism, but it is generally true that the two views are closely related.

[3] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[4] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[5] Martinich (1996: 556).

[6] Blackburn (1996: 276). Blackburn also explains Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677) is noted for this view within Western philosophy

[7] Martinich (1996: 556). The doctrine that all things exist in God. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[8] Martinich (1996: 556).

[9] This is my example based on Erickson’s presentation. Erickson (1994: 303-307).

[10] Nikkel (2003: 1). Many modern theologians and philosophers now question the concept of an eternal God. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[11] Nikkel (2003: 1). God is not eternal within this view. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[12] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[13] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[14] Schelling lived (1775-1854). Blackburn (1996: 341).

[15] Schelling (1845)(1936: 32).

[16] Schelling (1845)(1936: 32). Schelling sought to deflect criticisms that he was a pantheist. ‘Unity is of essence, but so is diversity.’ Gutmann (1845)(1936: xxxi). However, his comments make it possible that he had views which were perhaps panentheistic. Material things are dependent on God and yet independent.

[17] Including that of Whitehead. Nikkel (2003: 2-3). Grenz and Olsen (1992: 142).

[18] My views are Reformed but not strictly within a certain camp such as Presbyterian or Baptist. I have primarily come to my Reformed views through MPhil and PhD research.

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BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GRENZ, STANLEY J. AND ROGER E. OLSON (1992) Twentieth Century Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GUTMANN, JAMES (1845)(1936) ‘Introduction’ in SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 

KREEFT, PETER and RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

MARTINICH, A.P. (1999) ‘Pantheism’ in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

NIKKEL, DAVID H. (2003) ‘Panentheism’, in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, MacMillan Reference USA, New York. 

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

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Process Theism: Alfred North Whitehead

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

David Viney (2008) suggests that Edgar Sheffield Brightman is one of the twentieth century proponents of Process theism.[1] Although Brightman’s views were primarily independently made, process theism refers to a general group of theological concepts attributed to Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947)[2] and Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000).[3]

Whitehead is the more preeminent exemplar and within Process and Reality (1927-1929)(1957) explains he desired to complete an account of humanity and its experience in relation to philosophical problems.[4] In Religion In The Making (1926) Whitehead explains it is legitimate to attempt with a more definite knowledge of metaphysics, to interpret human experience, but these general principles must be amplified and adapted into one general system of truth.[5]

Whitehead disagreed with a traditional view of a ‘transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys.’[6] The nature of God needed to be philosophically constructed anew.[7] A balance is sought between God’s immanence and transcendence, and a concept of static transcendence is rejected as instead God is understood to have a evolutionary transcendence. God and the physical realm are immanent with each other and God’s transcendence means their realities are not identical and not always determined by each other.[8] God is fully reasoned to be involved and influenced by temporal events and processes.[9] These processes unfold as sequences of events over time. God, contrary to classic and traditional Christian theism is finite, temporal, changeable and experiences intense emotion, pain and sadness. Whitehead explains that ‘It is not true that God is on all respects infinite.’[10] Process theology is a philosophical approach that does not rely on any kind of divine revelation.[11] Instead it relies on a process of change over time as a theory of metaphysics.[12] God’s actual concrete nature is responsive and influenced by the processes that take in the world, and therefore God is limited. Some things are unknowable for God, that he only can realize as they happen, and as these new things develop God’s knowledge processes over time. Divine sovereignty is questionable and certainly no longer absolute within this system.

Whitehead, a mathematician and philosopher, established a speculative philosophy of metaphysics within a scientific non-metaphysical reality.[13] This system is an attempt to adequately explain all individual beings in existence, including God.[14] Basically a system of metaphysics needed to be developed that would work with modern scientific theories and reality, and therefore God was not a ‘static essence’ but a process.[15] The ‘actual entities’[16] that make up this process are non-permanent and transient and each action and activity is dipolar having a physical pole of the past and a mental pole which is a possibility that can be achieved.[17] The physical pole feels the physical reality of actual entity, while the mental pole feels or prehends as Whitehead calls it, the eternal objects by which actual entities have conceptual definiteness.[18] These physical and mental poles are an aspect of every real being/actual entities although they are not real things themselves.[19]

Prehends is the feeling of grasping the physical and conceptual information concerning actual entities.[20] This will occur within a stream and series of occasions.[21] All occurrences take place within the process of these actual entities.[22] Each event is partially self-created and partially influenced by other occasions and entities.[23] God is also dipolar[24] and his nontemporal pole is where God conceives the infinite variety of external objects and sees the possibilities and provides the opportunity for the process of becoming. God is an actual entity and being.[25] God has a primordial nature and consequent nature, with the primordial being conceptual, while the consequent nature is God as conscious.[26] Whitehead explains that the ‘consequent nature is the weaving of God’s physical feelings upon his primordial concepts.’[27] God’s primordial conceptual nature is infinite and does not have negative prehension/feelings, and is eternal and unconscious.[28] This nature is permanent as God works out endless possibilities.[29] God in his vision can determine every possibility and adjust details where needed.[30] The consequent nature of God originates with physical experience with the material temporal world and it is integrated with the primordial conceptual nature.[31] The consequent nature as conscious is determined, finite and incomplete.[32] These two aspects of God’s deity can be distinguished but are inseparable.[33] This consequent conscious nature had God constantly acquiring new experiences.[34]

A problem arises that if God’s primordial nature is eternal and unconscious[35] it precedes the consequent nature that is temporal and has consciousness. I question whether an unconscious deity would in any way proceed to a conscious temporal reality. Where did God’s consciousness come from? I reason consciousness would have to exist eternally to lead to a finite reality of consciousness.

________________

[1] Viney (2008: 35).

[2] Viney (2008: 1).

[3] Viney (2008: 1).

[4] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: vi).

[5] Whitehead (1926: 149).

[6] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 404).

[7] Whitehead (1926: 150).

[8] Viney (2008: 10).

[9] Viney (2008: 1).

[10] Whitehead (1926: 153). Whitehead claims that if God was infinite in all ways this would make him as infinitely evil as he is good. I doubt logically and reasonably that an infinitely holy and good God could at the same time be infinitely evil and so I can grant Whitehead half a point here. However, God could still be infinite completely in nature and willingly allow evil to exist within his creation. I definitely agree with Whitehead that an infinitely good and evil God would be a God of nothingness. Whitehead (1926: 153). I doubt this being could logically exist.

[11] Viney (2008: 1).

[12] Viney (2008: 1).

[13] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 135).

[14] Diehl (1996: 881).

[15] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 135).

[16] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 135).

[17] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 136).

[18] Diehl (1996: 881). Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[19] Viney (2008: 8).

[20] Diehl (1996: 881). Viney (2008: 9).

[21] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 136).

[22] Diehl (1996: 881).

[23] Diehl (1996: 881).

[24] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[25] Viney (2008: 9).

[26] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[27] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[28] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[29] Viney (2008: 9).

[30] Whitehead (1926: 153-154).

[31] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[32] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[33] Viney (2008: 9).

[34] Viney (2008: 9).

[35] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[36] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 142). I am not stating that this is the case in every documented view of process theism, but it is generally true that the two views are closely related.

[37] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[38] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[39] Blackburn (1996: 276). Blackburn also explains Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677) is noted for this view within Western philosophy

[40] Nikkel (2003: 1).

---

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

DIEHL, DAVID W. (1996) ‘Process Theology’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GRENZ, STANLEY J. AND ROGER E. OLSON (1992) Twentieth Century Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

NIKKEL, DAVID H. (2003) ‘Panentheism’, in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, MacMillan Reference USA, New York.

VINEY, DAVID (2008) ‘Process Theism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Palo Alto, California, Stanford University.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1926) Religion in the Making, New York, The MacMillan Company.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1927-1929)(1957) Process and Reality, New York, The Free Press/MacMillan Publishing Company, Incorporated.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1967)(1986) ‘Adventures of Ideas’, in Forest Wood JR., Whiteheadian Thought as a Basis for a Philosophy of Religion, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, University Press of America, Inc.

20251121

'God in pantheism may be considered to be equal with a tree. God in panentheism may be considered beyond the tree, but the vital force within it, where as in my traditional Christian theistic understanding God is beyond a tree and sustains it, but is not the vital force within it.'

Pantheism is a form of monism, as in reasoning the theistic is of a single substance, nature and entity. This is error as God is infinite, eternal and necessary, in contrast to created things which are finite, non-eternal, potentially everlasting, contingent, entities. 

Panentheism views God in all things, but not identical with all things. It understands the existence of both the infinite/necessary and finite/contingent within reality and within God. God therefore, within panentheism would be understood as having both a necessary aspect and a contingent aspect. From my Reformed theological, worldview, I view this as contradictory as the finite is not divine and cannot be divine. Note that the classic understanding of the incarnation of Jesus Christ is that his divine (infinite) nature and human (finite) nature cannot logically mix, and do not mix.

My Reformed theological perspective views the infinite, eternal God as creating and sustaining the finite. God is not the vital, infinite, force within the finite, but is the vital, infinite force sustaining the finite.

'Whitehead explains that ‘It is not true that God is on all respects infinite.’[10]'  '[10] Whitehead (1926: 153). Whitehead claims that if God was infinite in all ways this would make him as infinitely evil as he is good. I doubt logically and reasonably that an infinitely holy and good God could at the same time be infinitely evil and so I can grant Whitehead half a point here. However, God could still be infinite completely in nature and willingly allow evil to exist within his creation. I definitely agree with Whitehead that an infinitely good and evil God would be a God of nothingness. Whitehead (1926: 153). I doubt this being could logically exist.'

God is in all respects, infinite. God is at the same time, in all respects logical. God is not contradictory within infinity. God is perfectly good and not evil. Everything God causes is for the good, with good motives, even when evil is secondarily caused. 

A classic example is the death of Jesus Christ on the cross and the resulting atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ applied to believers. The triune God, as the primary cause, had perfectly good motives for the gospel. Secondary causes include, Satan that had evil motives in persuading Judas to betray Jesus Christ. Satan desired his own worship, see Matthew 4 and Luke 4, even from Jesus Christ himself. The Jewish and Roman authorities, crucified him with evil motives, which based on the New Testament could be reasoned were primarily religious/political in the first case and political in the second case.

Links

Friday, January 01, 2010 Does God evolve? 



Wednesday, August 10, 2016 The Trinity: Panentheism & Pantheism

Saturday, July 25, 2020 Pantheism, Panentheism, The Trinity II: Non-exhaustive